The extremist preacher Abdullah al-Muhaysini no longer has to worry about US sanctions. In late August 2026, the US Department of the Treasury removed the former jihadist from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list, or SDN List. It includes individuals and organizations whose assets are frozen in the US and with whom US citizens are generally not allowed to do business.
After Syria’s civil war broke out in 2011, al-Muhaysini recruited fighters and helped establish a governing structure shaped by the Nusra Front, which emerged from al-Qaeda.
His removal from the list is linked to the new US government policy on Syria: Washington also removed the Nusra Front and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the SDN List.
25 years after the September 11 attacks, this is a remarkable snapshot. Al-Qaeda — which means “the base” in Arabic — has neither disappeared nor remained the same organization: Its core has weakened, but its regional branches have remained strong across parts of Africa and Asia, observers agree.
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Regional offshoots in the Sahel, Yemen and Afghanistan
Only, al-Qaeda itself is operating less and less under its own name.
“This is largely due to the successful counterterrorism efforts following 2001,” Lars Berger, professor of terrorism studies at the German Federal University of Administrative Sciences, told DW.
The military campaign in Afghanistan, along with cooperation between intelligence agencies and police, has significantly weakened the group.
“From this perspective, the September 11 attacks were a major strategic failure for al-Qaeda,” Berger said.
The hoped-for radicalization of the Arab world and the overthrow of its regimes failed to materialize. About ten years after the attacks in New York and Washington, al-Qaeda’s most famous figure, Osama bin Laden, was killed in May 2011.
As a result, al-Qaeda reorganized itself.
“The militia sought out areas where it could establish a permanent foothold, for example in parts of Africa or Yemen,” Berger said, adding that “countries with weak state structures, overwhelmed security forces and unresolved local conflicts are particularly favorable.”
“Today, this is particularly true of Africa,” Rüdiger Lohlker, professor emeritus of Islamic studies at the University of Vienna, notes.
In the Sahel, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, has emerged as a powerful al-Qaeda offshoot, he said.
An analysis by the think tank Critical Threats Project uses Niger as an example to show how JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) compete for territory, fighters and resources. In June 2026, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on the international airport in Niger’s capital, Niamey.
In Somalia, al-Shabab — a group closely linked to al-Qaeda — is strong, and in Yemen, al-Qaeda is present in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Afghanistan also remains a safe haven for the terrorist organization.
However, the success of these offshoots cannot be explained solely by jihadist ideology, Lohlker added.
Rather, it often coincides with a kind of “economy of violence,” he said, noting that “violence including kidnappings, smuggling and looting has long been an economic factor for terrorism.”
He also said that there are veritable “markets for violence:” Where money can be made through violence, jihadist organizations can also recruit and retain followers.
“We fundamentally need to move away from a Eurocentric perspective,” Lohlker further points out.
In his view, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups have always been far more present outside Europe and the US than it has appeared from a Western perspective.
Al-Qaeda’s regional involvement
However, over the years, the offshoots’ strategies have undergone a change. According to Lars Berger, there has been a “strategic shift” away from direct attacks on the “distant enemy” and toward the establishment of local structures.
“We are now seeing an attempt to proceed in an alternative and gradual manner, namely instead of spectacular acts of violence ordered from the highest levels, there are smaller-scale actions that are more grassroots in nature,” he said.
In the Sahel, this entails forming local alliances, gaining influence in communities, and controlling territories. The Critical Threats Project describes this development as “localization.”
Al-Qaeda is thus surviving precisely through this differentiation. JNIM capitalizes on ethnic and social conflicts in the Sahel, while al-Shabaab exploits conflicts within Somali clan structures. The global jihadist goal remains as an ideological framework, but the actual fighting takes place on the ground.
Al-Qaeda competes with the “Islamic State”
In the competition for public attention, however, al-Qaeda faces a superior rival: the so-called “Islamic State,” or IS.
“Ultimately, younger jihadists tend to be more drawn to the ‘Islamic State,’” terrorism expert Behnam Heidenreuter-Said, head of the research center for Strategic Police Research at the Hamburg Police Academy, told DW.
IS has carried out “more spectacular” and media-effective terrorist attacks, he said, highlighting that “al-Qaeda has taken a more long-term approach.”
Heidenreuter-Said, who published a comprehensive history of al-Qaeda in 2018, added that “IS wanted to make a splash and demonstrate successes as quickly as possible in order to grow explosively.”
However, IS’s expansion was followed by its collapse, he said. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, continues to exist, albeit under changed circumstances.
Shortage of al-Qaeda updates
The terrorist group meanwhile faces the question of whether it can replace its aging fighters. Although this is conceivable, al-Qaeda as a brand is visibly fading, Heidenreuter-Said observed. In Europe in particular, militant jihadism has become less attractive. However, jihadist ideas have not disappeared, al-Qaeda has simply lost its former ability to mobilize large numbers of young people, he said.
It is hard to say just how dangerous the organization actually still is, Behnam Heidenreuter-Said points out.
“Everyone agrees that there is currently virtually no information about al-Qaeda and we simply don’t know what it is doing right now,” he said.
Furthermore, since the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, it has been striking how little al-Qaeda has been visible in the major regional conflicts, he said. In his view, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran have dominated the political and military stage.
This article was translated from German.
