Commentary: A weak South China Sea code of conduct will be worse than no agreement at all

As Singapore takes over as ASEAN chair in 2027, what remains unresolved on the South China Sea code of conduct are arguably the most intractable issues, says Collin Koh from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.


Commentary

Commentary: A weak South China Sea code of conduct will be worse than no agreement at all

As Singapore takes over as ASEAN chair in 2027, what remains unresolved on the South China Sea code of conduct are arguably the most intractable issues, says Collin Koh from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Commentary: A weak South China Sea code of conduct will be worse than no agreement at all

File picture of Philippine resupply vessel Unaizah May hit by Chinese Coast Guard water cannon blast as it tried to enter the Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, in the disputed South China Sea, on Mar 5, 2024. (Photo: AP/Aaron Favila)

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Koh Swee Lean Collin

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SINGAPORE: As the dust settles at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manila with a slew of agreements, the much-anticipated Code of Conduct in the South China Sea isn’t one of them.

ASEAN and China have provisionally agreed on 80 per cent of the text. That sounds tantalisingly close to the finishing line but the remaining 20 per cent may prove far harder to resolve.

To Manila’s credit, as the 2026 ASEAN chair, it had made finalising the code this year a key priority and oversaw intensified negotiations. China and several ASEAN members have overlapping claims in the South China Sea and maritime clashes, notably between China and the Philippines, have raised fears of escalation.

Now the hot potato is passed over to Singapore as ASEAN chair for 2027.

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Secretary-General Kao Kim Hoorn said ASEAN expects talks to conclude next year. Philippine Foreign Minister Ma Theresa Lazaro also said: “I trust that Singapore will be able to finish the discussions.”

Whether this can all be finalised within next year is a huge question mark. But the pressure to finish negotiations must not come at the expense of producing a code that meaningfully reduces tensions in the South China Sea.

 

LAST-MILE JOURNEY MAY BE THE HARDEST

The remaining 20 per cent left unresolved represents arguably the most intractable issues.

The original single draft text adopted in 2018 was essentially a collection of the various negotiating parties’ proposals. Many concern practical security cooperation measures, such as joint efforts to deal with common threats such as aeronautical emergencies and environmental problems. Paragraphs overlapped, proposals were repeated and items continued to be subtracted or added in the years since. 

It would not be presumptuous to believe that much of the progress in the past year involved the consolidation of repetitive items and tidying up this “living document”. Among the contentious issues highlighted by the Philippines in the lead-up to the summit were where the code would apply geographically and how to define the core principle of self-restraint.

On self-restraint, the code needs to clearly define what is unacceptable behaviour in the South China Sea. But the more prescriptive the “dos and don’ts”, the harder it can become to secure agreement when negotiating parties prefer flexibility to interpret such terms of references and assert national interests.

Self-restraint for Beijing, for example, is about refraining from conducting military exercises with extra-regional actors unless “parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection”.



ASEAN members would likely push back against a provision that could give China a de facto veto over their sovereign prerogative to pursue military cooperation with external partners. Several ASEAN countries regularly conduct maritime exercises in the South China Sea with countries like the United States, India and Japan, such as the frequent maritime cooperative activities conducted bilaterally or multilaterally between the Philippines and its foreign partners, often close to Chinese-claimed features.

These disagreements have persisted for decades. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) intended as a precursor to the code currently under negotiation.

Rising tensions since then make finalising the code more urgent, but at the same time, erodes the trust needed for negotiations. Leaving the notion of self-restraint open-ended would make the code no different from its 2002 precursor, and risk varying interpretations and hence potential breaches.

INEFFECTIVE WITHOUT CREDIBLE ENFORCEMENT

The code will only be effective if countries can be held to it. Whether the document would be legally-binding on all signatories remains a contentious issue.



But the question of legal status becomes almost moot, unless the parties can agree to credible measures that ensure compliance, verification and enforcement of the code. They must also agree on the appropriate institution to oversee implementation of the code and how alleged violations should be addressed.

In the original 2018 draft text, two main proposals were made – to use existing ASEAN-China meetings and working groups related to the implementation of the DOC; or to establish a dedicated commission. In either case, consensus would be required in the event of arbitrating a violation. 

WHAT ASEAN RISKS WITH A WEAK AGREEMENT 

So it bears asking whether all these outstanding issues can be satisfactorily addressed within one more year.

While not a formal deadline, this inevitably creates public pressures that could pull negotiations in 2027. This could come at the expense of producing a truly effective code, if the overriding objective becomes one of churning out a document to meet a perceived deadline.

A weak code would undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea. Importantly, it could undermine ASEAN’s credibility more than another delay. 

This code would be a test of ASEAN’s ability to address thorny security challenges, after being often derided as nothing more than a “talk shop”. A weak code that reeks more of symbolism than substance would validate such criticism.

Collin Koh is senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 

Source: CNA/ch

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