Snap Insight: US-Iran MOU is not yet a deal to end the war
While the preliminary agreement is welcome, there are still many more details to iron out before the world can feel relief, says Carl Skadian from the NUS Middle East Institute.
U.S. President Donald Trump attends a bilateral meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (not pictred) on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein
New: You can now listen to articles.
This audio is generated by an AI tool.
Read a summary of this article on FAST.
Get bite-sized news via a new
cards interface. Give it a try.
Click here to return to FAST
Tap here to return to FAST
FAST
SINGAPORE: News that the United States and Iran presidents have signed a preliminary agreement on Wednesday (Jun 17) to end their war has understandably generated a frisson of relief around a world weary of the conflict and its economic fallout.
But this agreement is not a deal to end the war. It is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that pauses the fighting and lays out the topline items an actual deal is supposed to achieve. By President Donald Trump’s own admission, if a permanent deal “doesn’t get done in 60 days … we go back to bombing”, which effectively means the threat of renewed hostilities has receded, but is not totally off the table.
Another admission by Mr Trump – a more startling one – was that he entered into the MOU to avoid “an economic catastrophe”. That is as good as saying that he was under serious pressure to pause his widely unpopular and economically painful war. His comment that he did not want to be Herbert Hoover, the US president in 1929 when the market crash that gave rise to the Great Depression occurred, was telling.
With that as context, further examination of the 14-point MOU appears to bolster the case being made by some that Iran came up trumps in a high-stakes showdown.
NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR REAL NEGOTIATIONS
The MOU’s ambiguous wording makes this difficult to conclusively say, but three elements provide a guide.
The first is that one of the main reasons the US went to war, Iran’s nuclear programme, remains unresolved. While the agreement says Iran will not procure or develop nuclear weapons, it does not specify what will be done about the current programme, including about 300kg or so of enriched uranium that is supposedly buried under rubble.
Instead, the issue will be tackled in the next round, in a “maximum of 60 days, extendable with mutual consent”. A pledge not to develop such weapons will require more than a fist bump, through a schedule of inspections and monitoring. Ensuring compliance is a complex issue and 60 days is not nearly enough.
By comparison, the 2015 nuclear agreement – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran, the US, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany) – took almost 20 months.
Time and again, Iran has proven adept at dragging out negotiations, so it should be no surprise if the 60 days come and go without resolution. As many experts are quick to warn, you can remove the implements for making a bomb, but getting rid of the expertise already gained is quite another matter altogether.
THE ONE FACTOR THAT WON OVER IRAN
The other central issue is the Strait of Hormuz. While the MOU commits both sides to dismantling the blockade within 30 days, the closure has a long tail: It will take months, if not longer, for things to go back to normal.
Paragraph 5 of the document also deserves greater scrutiny: It says, in part, that Iran will “make arrangements with its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days”. It further allows for Iran to talk to Oman, and other Persian Gulf littoral states, to “define the future administration and maritime services” in the strait.
Iran’s closure of the strait and the issue of tolls had sparked debate about free passage under international law, including in Singapore, which reiterated the principle that it and its littoral neighbours also apply in the Strait of Malacca.
Finally, the deal makes Iran’s frozen assets, estimated in the region of US$100 billion, available to it. So, forget the stick – that is an enormous carrot to dangle.
This is possibly the one factor that prodded Iran to come to an agreement after thousands of bombs, missiles, drones, and a threat to “wipe out” its civilisation, as well as Mr Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender”, failed.
There are further sweeteners: The MOU commits the US to “undertake with regional partners” the development of a “plan with at least US$300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, and the lifting of crippling sanctions against the country when (or if) a final deal is signed.
THE HEAVY LIFTING IS JUST BEGINNING
Given these elements, there is a final question to be asked when it comes to unpacking the MOU: Were Iran, the US, the region, and the world better off on Feb 27, the day before the war began? Or, indeed, in 2015, when the JCPOA was signed?
Importantly, the impact on the Iranian people is perhaps the most complex part to answer.
Worsening economic woes forced many Iranians onto the streets in protest in December 2025 and January 2026, reportedly the biggest mass unrest in Iran since the 1979 revolution. A sharp crackdown by the authorities led to an untold number of deaths, and tens of thousands of arrests. Against that backdrop, Mr Trump promised Iranians that “help is on its way”.
When the war began just over a month later, the Iranian leadership was decapitated. However, a new leadership, headed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s son, is reportedly even more hardline.
Iranians who wanted a government that gave them more options had their hopes dashed. And now their economic problems have only been compounded by the war, with many struggling just to get by each day. Perhaps the MOU’s sections on future funding may provide them with a lifeline, but the regime’s past record does not inspire confidence.
For now, the situation has moved beyond the “not peace, not war” groundhog day that the last few months have become. But while the MOU – remember, it is not an ironclad agreement – may bring some relief, many details remain to be ironed out. The heavy lifting is just beginning.
Carl Skadian, a former journalist and editor for 30 years, is deputy director at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.
Source: CNA/ch
Sign up for our newsletters
Get the CNA app
Stay updated with notifications for breaking news and our best stories
Get WhatsApp alerts
Join our channel for the top reads for the day on your preferred chat app
Get bite-sized news via a new
cards interface. Give it a try.
Click here to return to FAST
Tap here to return to FAST
FAST
About The Author
