On July 1, Vietnam’s first Population Law took effect, introducing a range of measures aimed at encouraging couples to have more children.
Women in targeted groups will receive a minimum childbirth subsidy of about €66 ($75).
Female employees who give birth to a second child are now entitled to seven months of maternity leave, up from six, while paternity leave for fathers whose wives have a second child has doubled to 10 working days.
Subsidies for prenatal and newborn screening will initially be offered to targeted groups before expanding nationwide in January. Families with at least two biological children may also receive priority access to social housing.
The law follows Vietnam’s decision last year to scrap its longstanding two-child policy. However, reversing demographic trends will not be easy. Vietnam’s fertility rate dropped to a record low of 1.91 children per woman in 2024, well below the replacement level of around 2.1.
By 2050, the share of Vietnam’s working-age population, those aged 15 to 64, is projected to fall from 68.6% to 63%. Meanwhile, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over is expected to rise from 8.4% to 21.2%, according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
A key concern is that Vietnam grows old before it becomes wealthy. GDP per capita reached about $5,000 last year, significantly lower than the levels achieved by Japan, South Korea and Singapore when they were at Vietnam’s stage of societal aging.
“If countries age before becoming rich, economic growth may slow, while income inequality and pressure on healthcare and social support systems may increase,” Bussarawan Teerawichitchainan, an associate professor of sociology and co-director of the Center for Family and Population Research at the National University of Singapore, told DW.
“This could have serious implications for well-being, especially among older adults with limited resources,” she added.
A region aging at different speeds
Across Southeast Asia, falling fertility rates and longer life expectancy are reshaping societies, though at varying rates.
In Singapore, the number of people aged 60 and above surpassed those under 15 around 2010. Thailand reached the same point in the mid-2010s. Vietnam is projected to follow by around 2035, according to the UN.
A growing elderly population places additional strain on healthcare services and the state, which must cover pension payments and other forms of social support.
That is especially concerning in Vietnam, where pension and social-insurance coverage remains uneven, particularly among the country’s large informal workforce.
Thailand’s experience shows that higher income levels do not eliminate these challenges. Its welfare system, healthcare sector and labor market are already adjusting to a shrinking workforce and a rapidly growing elderly population.
Aging trends vary across Southeast Asia, creating both challenges and opportunities.
Thailand has long depended on migrant workers from neighboring Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, where working-age populations are expected to grow or remain static by 2050.
Migration can help ease labor shortages in sectors such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing and care work, though it also requires governments to strengthen migrant rights and access to services.
Singapore has long relied on immigration and foreign labor to support its workforce, even as migration remains politically sensitive.
Vietnam, by contrast, has a small immigrant population and has shown little inclination to rely on large-scale inward migration in response to aging.
Beyond the race for more babies
However, a growing chorus of analysts and experts argues that governments should rethink the conversation. Instead of viewing aging solely as an economic problem to be solved by increasing births, governments must focus on enabling people to live longer, healthier and more productive lives.
In Thailand and Vietnam, policy debates remain heavily focused on the total fertility rate because it provides a clear and measurable target, said Wiraporn Pothisiri, an associate professor at Chulalongkorn University’s College of Population Studies.
Yet, “fertility has continued to decline despite these efforts, suggesting that low fertility is driven by broader structural economic and social changes that cannot be reversed through pronatalist policies alone,” she told DW.
These underlying factors are the consequences of the rapid urbanization and industrialization seen across Southeast Asia since the early 1990s.
Pothisiri argued that a more effective approach would be to help couples achieve their desired family size while strengthening the health, productivity and resilience of the existing workforce.
“Unlike higher fertility, whose economic benefits will not be realized for at least two decades, reducing preventable mortality can strengthen demographic resilience immediately by preserving the existing and future workforce, particularly in countries with large avoidable mortality gaps,” she added.
This would require investment not only in childcare and family support, but also in preventive healthcare, flexible retirement policies and technologies that help older people remain independent.
Countries that are better prepared are those that treat aging as a societal transformation, not only as a fertility problem, Teerawichitchainan said.
Singapore is a useful example, she noted. “It has combined efforts to raise fertility with policies on active aging, workforce retraining, extended working lives, healthcare planning and differentiated immigration channels for professionals as well as middle- and lower-skilled workers.”
Mindset change needed?
Another mindset change would see an aging population as a sign of success.
“Everybody wants to live longer. Yes, there are challenges, but we should not forget that it is a celebration,” Aris Ananta, a professor of economics at Universitas Indonesia, told DW.
Ananta said governments should promote “active and healthy aging,” extending the period during which people remain healthy, independent and socially engaged.
That includes allowing older people to work for longer, easing the strains on the economy as the working-age population declines.
The success of this approach will mean that being “old” no longer starts at 60 or 65, but at 70, 75, or even 80, Ananta added.
Such a shift would not eliminate demographic pressures, but it would redefine success, moving beyond simply increasing birth rates to ensuring that longer lives are healthy, productive and secure.
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru
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